Battle: Brandywine Creek
War: American Revolution
Date: 11th September 1777
Place: Pennsylvania, west of Philadelphia
Combatants: British and Hessian troops against the American Continental Army
Generals: Major General Sir William Howe and General George Washington

British Light Dragoon

Size of the armies: Around 6,000 British and Hessians against 8,000 Americans.

Uniforms, arms and equipment: The British wore red coats and headgear of bearskin caps, leather caps or tricorne hats depending on whether the troops were grenadiers, light infantry or battalion company men. The two regiments of light dragoons serving in America, the 16th and 17th, wore red coats and leather crested helmets. The German infantry wore blue coats and retained the Prussian style grenadier mitre with brass front plate.
The Americans dressed as best they could. Increasingly as the war progressed regular infantry regiments of the Continental Army wore blue uniform coats but the militia continued in rough clothing. Both sides were armed with muskets and guns. The Pennsylvania regiments carried long, small calibre, rifled weapons.

Winner: The British and Hessians were left occupying the field having driven the Americans from their position on Brandywine Creek.

British grenadier, 49th Foot, North America 1777 

16th Light Dragoons later the 16th/5th Lancers and now the Queen’s Royal Lancers


Two Composite battalions of grenadiers


Two Composite battalions of light infantry


Two Composite bumberland Fusiliers and now the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers


10th Foot later the Royal Lincolnshire Regiment and the Royal Anglian Regiment
15th Foot later the East Yorkshire Regiment and now the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire


17th Foot later the Royal Leicestershire Regimend nowattalions of Foot Guards (1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards)


4th Foot later the King’s Royal Regiment and now the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment


5th Foot later Nortt and now the Royal Anglian Regiment


23rd Foot, the Royal Welch Fusiliers
27th Foot later the Inniskilling Fusiliers and now the Royal Irish Regiment


28th Foot later the Gloucestershire Regiment and now the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment


33rd Foot now the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment

37th Foot later the Hampshire Regiment and now the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment


40th Foot later the South Lancashire Regiment and now the Queen’s Lancashire Regiment


44th Foot later the Essex Regiment and now the Royal Anglian Regiment


46th Foot later the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry and now the Light Infantry


49th Foot later The Royal Berkshire Regiment, then The Duke of Edinburgh’s Royal Regiment, then The Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment and now The Rifles


55th Foot later the Border Regiment and now the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment


64th Foot later the North Staffordshire Regiment and now the Staffordshire Regiment


Three battalions of Fraser’s Highlanders, the 71st Foot.

The Battle of Brandywine Creek 
American Units: 
Wayne’s Pennsylvania Brigade


Weeden’s Viriginia Brigade


Muhlenburg’s Virginia Brigade


Proctor’s Artillery


Delaware Regiment

Hazen’s Canadian Regiment


Maxwell’s Light Infantry


Colonel Bland’s 1st Dragoons


Pennsylvania Militia


De Borre’s Brigade


Stephen’s Division


Stirling’s Division

Account:
Howe had brought his army by sea to the Chesapeake intending to capture Philadelphia. Washington marched south to Wilmington and attempted to delay the capture of the city falling back before the British and Hessian army.

On 9th September 1777 Washington’s army took positions behind the Brandywine Creek at Chad’s Ford (now Chadds Ford). The creek flowed through undulating countryside with steep cliffs in places and heavily wooded hills. Below Chad’s Ford the flow became narrower and faster so as to be unfordable. A number of fords marked the creek up to the point where it divided into east and west branches. 
Washington expected Howe’s army to march from Kennett Square in the West up to Chad’s Ford and carry out a frontal assault.

Pennsylvania militia were posted to the left of the Chad’s Ford position where little threat was perceived. Washington positioned Wayne’s Pennsylvania Continentals with Weedon’s and Mulenburg’s brigades in the centre opposite Chad’s Ford, under the command of Major General Nathaniel Greene. British Foot
Major General John Sullivan commanded on the right, posting forces under Colonel Moses Hazen at the distant Wistar’s and Buffington’s Fords. Light Infantry and picquet's were posted to the West of the creek to give warning of the British advance.

At around noon on 11th September 1777 the first British and loyalist troops came down the road from Kennett Square, Major Patrick Ferguson’s Riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers, followed by two British brigades (4th, 5th, 23rd, 49th, 10th, 27th, 28th, 40th Foot and three battalions of Fraser’s 71st Highlanders) and a Hessian brigade. The column was commanded by the Hessian Lieutenant General Knyphausen. He had a squadron of 16th Light Dragoons and guns.

Knyphausen marched to the ford, his battalions took position along the hills on the west bank and he began to cannonade the American positions across the river.

The Battle of Brandywine Creek : The attack of the British 46th Foot

In the meantime the second British column under Howe and Major General Lord Cornwallis had turned North to cross the creek some miles upstream of the Chad’s Ford position. This column would then encircle the Americans’ rear right flank and cut them off from the Philadelphia road.

Washington appears to have been advised of the British encircling movement by Hazen’s distant troops, but to have discounted the warning for some hours. He and his staff were convinced that the main attack was to be a frontal assault over Chad’s Ford. It was not until early afternoon that he was finally persuaded that the main British movement was to his right rear. During that time he began an assault across the ford but withdrew it.

On the alarm being given Sullivan marched his right wing of the American army to the North East and, meeting the retreating Hazen, formed his troops on a hill at the Birmingham Meeting House. Howe’s regiments formed three columns and attacked the Americans.

Finally convinced of his mistake by the sound of the bombardment, Washington dispatched Greene with the American reserve to support Sullivan. By that time the British attack had driven Sullivan’s troops off the hill and Greene and Sullivan were forced to withdraw from the field.

At Chad’s Ford, Knyphausen launched an assault across the river, led by the 4th and 5th Foot. A force of British Foot Guards and grenadiers emerged from the forest, where it had been temporarily lost, and attacked the right flank of the troops at the ford. The Americans were driven from their positions.
The battle ended with the American army withdrawing up the road to Philadelphia in considerable confusion and the British encamped on the battlefield. Nightfall saved the Americans from greater loss.

Casualties: The British lost 550 killed and wounded. The Americans lost around 1,000 killed, wounded and captured and 11 guns, 2 of which had been taken at Trenton. The Marquis de Lafayette, fighting with Sullivan, was among the wounded.

Follow-up: Brandywine is not considered a decisive battle. Nevertheless it hastened the loss of Philadelphia to the British. The British failed to exploit their success.

The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799.
At Midnight, Chester, September 11, 1777.

Sir: I am sorry to inform you, that in this day's engagement, we have been obliged to leave the enemy masters of the field. Unfortunately the intelligence received of the enemy's advancing up the Brandywine, and crossing at a ford about six miles above us, was uncertain and contradictory, notwithstanding all my pains to get the best. This prevented my making a disposition, adequate to the force with which the Enemy attacked us on the right; in consequence of which the troops first engaged, were obliged to retire before they could be reinforced.

In the midst of the attack on the right, that body of the Enemy which remained on the other side of Chad's Ford, crossed it, and attacked the division there under the command of General Wayne and the light troops under General Maxwell who, after a severe conflict, also retired. The Militia under the command of Major Genl. Armstrong, being posted at a ford, about two miles below Chad's, had no opportunity of engaging. But though we fought under many disadvantages, and were from the causes, above mentioned obliged to retire, yet our loss of men is not, I am persuaded, very considerable,

I believe much less than the enemy's. We have also lost about seven or eight pieces of cannon, according to the best information I can at present obtain. The baggage having been previously moved off, is all secure, saving the men's Blankets, which being at their backs, many of them doubtless are lost.

I have directed all the Troops to Assemble behind Chester, where they are now arranging for this Night. Notwithstanding the misfortune of the day, I am happy to find the troops in good spirits; and I hope another time we shall compensate for the losses now sustained. The Marquis La Fayette was wounded in the leg, and Genl. Woodford in the hand. Divers other Officers were wounded and some Slain, but the number of either cannot now be ascertained. I have & ca.
P.S. It has not been in my power to send you earlier intelligence; the present being the first leisure moment I have had since the action.1

General George Washington at Valley Forge, winter 1777

[Note 1: Greene's Life of Nathanael Greene (vol. I, p. 454) relates that Washington was too fatigued to write to Congress after the battle and directed one of his aides to do it. Harrison was too "distressed," and so it fell to Pickering, the Adjutant General. "I wrote it and gave it to the General to read. He, with perfect composure, directed me to add a consolatory hope that another day would give a more fortunate result." Both the draft and the letter signed are in Pickering's writing and, in view of the importance attached to Pickering's recollections of Washington by some, it should be noted that neither draft nor letter signed show any evidence that the "consolatory hope" was an addition to the letter, while the postscript, as above, was evidently an after thought. This is sufficient to show the necessity of accepting Pickering's recollections with some caution.
Congress had requested Washington (September 9): "to appoint a proper person at headquarters to write to the president twice a day, or oftener if necessary, advising the position and movements of the armies" The Board of War was ordered to appoint expresses to convey these letters.]

Story of - ‘The Brandywine Flash’

Regarding recent interest in Regimental traditions originating during the American War of Independence, there have been references to the Royal Berkshire's 'Brandywine Flash' and the controversial night actions at Paoli and Old Tappan. Here's some background information.

The Battle of Paoli
(also known as the Battle of Paoli Tavern or the Paoli Massacre) was a battle in the Philadelphia campaign of the American Revolutionary War fought on September 20, 1777.

During the early years of the AWI, The 49th Foot (later 1st Royal Berkshires - ultimately the RGBWLI) had its light company seconded to the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, a composite unit formed from the light companies of the 40th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 49th, 52nd, 55th, 63rd,
64th, 37th, 46th, 57th & 71st Regiments, all serving in General Sir William Howe's force assembled to put down the rebellion in the north east.

(The First Light Infantry consisted of companies from: 4th, 5th, 10th,15th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 33rd, 35th, 38th and 42nd Regiments)

In September 1777, following the British victory at Brandywine Creek, General Howe's advance to Philadelphia was being shadowed by Pennsylvanian General Anthony Wayne who was lurking with his division on the rear right flank of the column of march. Maj Gen Sir Charles Grey was sent with the 2nd LI, the 42nd Royal Highland Regiment and the 44th Regiment to deal with this threat. As the brigade advanced under cover of darkness and bad weather, Grey ordered that the force should attack with the bayonet alone and, to prevent their advance being given away, ordered that flints should be extract from muskets. At least one CO, Major John Maitland of the 2nd LI (A Marine, BTW), demurred and asked that weapons should simply remain unloaded. The Pennsylvanian division was caught in camp near the 'General Paoli' Tavern and withdrew in disorder although Wayne managed to organise a covering force to allow most of his men to escape. It was said that the Americans lost 400 men. The next day, 50 or so bodies were recovered around the camp. 70 prisoners were taken, many of them wounded and left behind with a British surgeon to supervise their care till Washington could provide medical treatment of his own. Nonetheless, talk of a massacre quickly spread, with tales of wounded and unarmed prisoners being bayoneted out of hand and burning to death in their makeshift brush shelters.

The 2nd Lights, in the first line of the assault, appear to have been singled out as the principal culprits, even though it was the 42nd, notoriously free with cold steel, acting as sweepers in the third line who set alight the enemy 'wigwams' and must have been equally in the frame. Nonetheless, the Lights were dubbed 'The Bloodhounds' and dark threats of vengeance were sent across the lines.

After Philadelphia was occupied, the British occupied positions around Germantown to the north and awaited a counter attack from Washington. An ambitious American night advance caught the British on the hop and emerging from the October mists, a Pennsylvanian brigade found themselves advancing on piquets of the 2nd LI. With howls of "Have at the Blood Hounds!" they sent the Lights tumbling back towards the main position and, according to Wayne himself, bayonetted any they caught up with.

The attack was checked in the end. After a fruitless eight month occupation, the British abandoned Philadelphia and returned to New York in June 1778. That autumn, the 2nd Lights were involved in another controversial night attack on an Light Dragoon outpost at Old Tappan in New Jersey. There were more stories of unarmed prisoners being 'skivered' out of hand. Shortly after, with regiments being withdrawn to form a force being sent to the West Indies, the two Light battalions in New York were amalgamated and that was the end of 'The Bloodhounds'.

The first reference to red feathers doesn't appear till 1821, when an old general recorded a story he'd been told about his uncle, John Maitland, the Marine CO of the 2nd Lights. According to his informant, the normally impassive Washington was so outraged by reports of British ruthlessness in the incident at Tappan in September 1778, that he vowed he would get 'satisfaction'. Maitland was said to have responded by saying, to make the job easier, he would order his men to wear red feathers in their headgear to make sure they could be identified.

However, within days of Tappan, Maitland is known to have transferred to the 71st Regiment (a Highland corps) as CO of the 1st Battalion and left for Georgia where he later died of fever. The story is a little ambiguous. The 71st Light Coy were prominent in the Tappan attack and it may have been them who were to be supplied with red feathers as they rejoined their regiment for the voyage to Savannah. Certainly, once in the South the 71st gave Washington further cause for resentment and plenty of opportunity to seek satisfaction. He got it at Cowpens and Yorktown.

Also from 1821 comes another old General's memoir. In that year the 42nd, by then renowned as 'The Black Watch,' felt the need to claim the red vulture feather they wore in their bonnet as their own exclusive distinction. This was duly granted but when the Adjutant General's office asked for a written account of how the distinction had come to be adopted, no one could say for certain so they turned to General James Stirling. One of the longest serving officers of the Regiment, Stirling had begun his service in America. He stated categorically that at the beginning of that war when the composite battalions were being formed, the 2nd Light Infantry were given red feathers to wear and when the 42nd were brigade with them, Howe ordered them to wear a red feather as well - 'to make the whole uniform.' (This is, incidentally, also the first documented reference to origin of the 'red hackle' although ambiguous paintings survive from c.1790. According to Stirling, however, it was not until 1802 after the battle of Alexandria that the King officially granted the Black Watch the right to wear this 'American' red feather. Accounts of a royal award made seven years earlier did not emerge until the 1840s). Much of the detail of Stirling's account is inconsistent with the recorded facts and it is not entirely logical but it seems unlikely the old General had simply imagined both the 2nd LI and the Black Watch wearing red feathers.

In 1833, when the 46th (South Devonshire) Regiment returned from 19 years continuous service in Australia and India, it was noticed that their light company was wearing a red feather in their dress shako as opposed to the regulation green worsted 'ball-tuft' (i.e. pom-pom) ordered by regulations four years previously. Unfortunately we only have the Adjutant General Office's letter enquiring when the Light Companies red feather distinction was authorised and a second letter giving cordial acceptance of whatever explanation was supplied and granting the distinction. The letters from the 46th have not survived.

However, we can assume that their account bore close relation to the story told 18 years later when the 'Historical Record of the 46th Regiment' was published 1851 as part of a series of regimental histories produced by the Adjutant General's office. This gives the earliest surviving version of the story behind the 46th Regiment's red feather.

The Americans having vowed vengeance for the attack at Paoli (which they deemed a "massacre"), and that they would give no quarter, the soldiers of the Light Battalion declared that in order to prevent any one not engaged in the action from suffering on their account, that they would dye the feathers worn in their caps red, as a distinguishing mark,

The Light Infantry's touching concern that their comrades should not have to answer for their deeds is a suitably Victorian twist on what, if it indeed happened, would be more credible as a simple act of bloody-minded defiance.

Meanwhile, sometime in the 1820s the 49th Princess Louise's (Hertfordshire) Regiment, were recreating their Regimental records destroyed in 1813 - appropriately while fighting the Americans in Upper Canada. The new Regimental Digest of Service noted a red feather was adopted by the light company during the AWI but managed to confuse the battle of Brandywine Creek with the night action at Paoli. However, In the case of the 49th, the tradition had not endured. It is worth pointing out that inspection reports for the light company of the 46th from after the AWI make no mention of a red feather, either.

In 1858, flank companies were abolished and the 46th South Devonshires were granted a red 'ball-tuft' in their shakos as a Regimental distinction. In 1878 the introduction of the Blue Cloth Home Service helmet finally rendered the redundant ball-tuft obsolete and the 46th lost their 'red feather' distinction. When in 1881 the 46th were combined with the 32nd Cornwall Light Infantry to form the DCLI, an emblem of crossed feathers in the new regiment's helmet plate badge revived the tradition. A red patch worn behind a Light infantry bugle horn badge on the Field Service Cap was later introduced as a more appropriate form. This was then worn with the khaki serge Service Dress cap from 1905, the khaki F.S. cap (1937) and on the beret during the Second World War and after.

Meanwhile the 49th had become the 1st Battalion, the Royal Berkshire Regiment. In 1934, it was decided for recruiting purposes to adopt a square, red patch behind the cap badge "to commemorate the part played by the Light Company of the 49th Regiment in action at Brandywine Creek" - the significance of the night action at Paoli was acknowledged at the time but soon forgotten.

   

From the start, the red patch was known as the "Brandywine Distinction" and when after 1945 it was transformed into an inverted red triangle behind the beret badge, supposedly recalling a red plume, it came to be known as the 'Brandywine Flash.' It was worn as such by the Royal Berkshire Regiment and The Duke of Edinburgh’s Royal Regiment (Berkshire & Wiltshire).

The Brandywine flash	As worn on the service forage cap  2” x 2.5” 1” square	As worn on the beret

 

It is ironic that in the 1960s soldiers in the KRRC - later 2 RGJ - were told the red backing to their cap badge was also a relic of campaigns in America. After the 60th Royal Americans' bloody victory over an Indian force, it was said, the feather's of the enemy dead were taken, dipped in their own blood and worn as trophies so the rest would know who it was who beat them. It never happened.

When the 60th became a Rifle Regiment, they simply adopted the red facings of their 5th Rifle Battalion. The red badge backing didn't appear until the late 19th century. The tale was a garbled borrowing of the LI red feathers from the AWI and the 5th Northumberland Regiment's tradition of taking white feathers from fallen French grenadiers at St Lucie in 1778. When all the infantry were ordered to wear white feathers in 1829, the 5th were authorised to wear theirs with a red tip to continue their distinction and the legend grew up that this symbolised the blood of the dead French staining their white feathers. This hackle is still worn by the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. And so it goes....

 1777 mozzotint of Howe